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Commentary: Some Lessons from the History of
Illinois Sentencing Laws
James B. Haddad*
Professor Zimring has provided us with a most thoughtful and
interesting account of the dynamics of the rise of determinate sentencing in the last decade. Mindful that between 1976 and 1979 at
least eight states' abolished the discretion of their paroling authorities,2 I agree with our speaker's observation that the resurrection
of determinate sentencing was both surprising and swift.
Professor Zimring's treatment of the last decade's developments in sentencing in several jurisdictions was instructive. We
also can benefit from attention to a lengthier history of sentencing
changes in a single jurisdiction. I will review some of the major
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1964; J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law, 1967; L.L.M., Northwestern University
School of Law, 1969. The author is indebted to Michael Armstrong of the California bar who, as a law student several years ago, prepared a paper, under the author's direction, surveying changes in Illinois sentencing statutes.
1. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125, 33.15.180, 33.20.010 (1980); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-304 (Supp. 1980);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2513A (Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3(b) (1979);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-3, 35-50-2-8, 35-50-6-1, 35-50-6-2 (Burns Supp. 1980);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1253, 1254 (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-15,
31-21-10 (Supp. 1980). Under some of these statutes, parole discretion was 'preserved for certain categories of cases.
2. With the notable exception of Maine, most jurisdictions that have recently
adopted determinate sentencing have not abolished "parole." Incarcerated felons
still receive a conditional and revocable release before the end of their terms.
What has been abolished is the administrative discretion to determine when parole should occur. Under the new statutes, the date of "parole," "supervised release" or "conditional release," is determined by a statutory or administrative
schedule of good-time credits. It is inaccurate to single out the Illinois legislature
for combining determinate sentences with parole, as some have done. See P. BIGGAM, DISCRETION, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND THE ILLINOIS PRISONER REVIEW

BOARD: A SHOTGUN WEDDING

(Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group 1979).

Whether use of conditional, revocable or supervised release fulfills a legitimate

purpose is a question entirely separate from the decision to abolish administrative
discretion as to the date of a prisoner's release from incarceration. For one empirical study intended to measure the utility of a parole board, see H. SACHS & C.
LOGAN, PAROLE: CRIME PREVENTION? OR CRIME POSTPONEMENT?

(1980). Illinois of-

ficials have long perceived a need for a period of supervised release following incarceration. See note 5 infra.
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alterations in the law of sentencing, back not to Hammurabi, but
to those occurring in Illinois since statehood. This historical overview will serve as a background for assessing Professor Zimring's
observations about the concern over disparate sentences and the
law-and-order rhetoric that often accompanied the last decade's
movement toward determinate sentencing.
ILLINOIS SENTENCING LAW CHANGES

The people and the legislature are always re-examining the
prevailing sentencing structure and are constantly dissatisfied;
they are always asking the same questions and often providing new
answers or rediscovering old ones. With great regularity we expand
or contract the sentencing role of the legislature, the judge, the
prosecutor, the jury, the governor and the administrators, sometimes in the name of fairness, sometimes in the name of law and
order.
I dissent from the assertion that a decade ago the people and
the legislature in Illinois were oblivious to sentencing issues. In the
early 1970's led in part by a citizen from outside the criminal justice community, legislators, academicians and system participants
engaged in a broad re-examination of the law of sentencing. 8 The
result was adoption of the state's first comprehensive code of corrections, effective January 1, 1973.' The Code expanded the prevailing principles of indeterminacy. For example, as to many offenses, it curbed the power of a judge to impose sentences such as
not less than three years nor more than three years and one day,
which were indeterminate in form, but determinate in substance.'
3. Robert Kent Scott was a corporate attorney who had no reputation among

the "regulars" in Illinois criminal law reform, but had demonstrated concern and

involvement in rehabilitative programs. Mr. Scott played a major role in drafting

the Unified Code and wrote the commentary which accompanied it and which
appears in the Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1-1008-6-1 (1973).

5. Sentences such as not less than three years nor more than three years and
one day were determinate in substance because parole eligibility came only one
day before the prisoner's "max out" date, leaving the parole authorities with no
zone of discretion. Sentences with such a short spread between minimum and
maximum can be made indeterminate in substance by application of a more gen-

erous good-time schedule to the minimum term than to the maximum term. However, in the late 1960's, the Illinois Department of Corrections abandoned its use

of separate schedules and applied a uniform good-time rate to the minimum and
the maximum terms. It was the "maxing out" without any period of supervised
release which led to the use of "conditional release," "mandatory supervised re-
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It withdrew a judge's ability, through the imposition of lengthy
consecutive sentences, to prevent parole. Even those sentenced
under former law, such as Richard Speck, the 1967 slayer of eight
nurses and student nurses, with his eight consecutive minimum
terms of fifty years, would be eligible for a parole hearing within
ten years of incarceration.'
lease" and the "added-on" parole term under Illinois law. See Haddad, The Parole-Term Concept, 63 ILL. BAR J. 236 (1974); Pusateri & Scott, Illinois' New
Unified Code of Corrections, 61 ILL. BAR J. 62, 63 (1973).
In many instances the Code of Corrections mandated the use of sentences
with a true spread. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1973) provided:
(3) for a Class 2 felony, the minimum term shall be 1 year unless
the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and character of defendant, sets a higher minimum term,
which shall not be greater than one-third of the maximum term set in
that case by the court;
(4) for a Class 3 felony, the minimum term shall be 1 year unless
the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and character of the defendant, sets a higher minimum
term which shall not be greater than one-third of the maximum term set
in that case by the court.
Most trial judges interpreted these provisions to permit a sentence of not less
than one year nor more than one year and one day, but to require a spread in the
ratio of one to three or more if the minimum term was more than one year. Reviewing courts did not have occasion to rule upon the validity of the one to one
and a day sentence. The statute did not require a true spread in sentences for
murder, Class 1 or'Class 4 felonies. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(c)(1), (2), (5)
(1973).
6. Eight consecutive sentences of fifty years under the statute were to be
treated like a single term of four hundred years. A prisoner with any regular or
aggregated term of twenty years or more was eligible for parole within twenty
years less good-time. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3(a) (1973). Statutory goodtime under Illinois Department of Corrections Regulations reduced the twenty
year period before parole eligibility to eleven years, three months. The maximum
possible compensatory good-time for persons who received long sentences for
crimes occurring before June 1, 1977, could further reduce the period before parole eligibility to nine years. See Illinois Department of Corrections Regulations
813 and 866. See also Hampton v. Rowe, 88 Ill. App. 3d 352, 410 N.E.2d 511
(1980). The 1978 law, P.A. 80-1099, made a significant change by empowering a
judge to ensure that a convicted murderer, for example, would remain incarcerated for lengthy periods. A forty-year sentence for murder means that release cannot come for twenty years, absent use of the governor's power of commutation. An"
eighty-year "extended term" sentence for murder means that release will come no
sooner than forty years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1(a)(1), 1005-8-2,
1003-6-3(a)(2) (1979). A "natural life" sentence means no release from prison
ever, absent commutation. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-3(d) (1979). Because judges already have used natural life sentences with some frequency, some
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In 1971, less than two years before the adoption of the Unified
Code of Corrections, there had been comprehensive changes in
sentences for marijuana, dangerous drug and narcotic offenses.7
Those changes lessened the statutory penalties and, in the name of
fairness, added distinctions based upon the nature of the substance
and its quantity, factors which had been irrelevant under old law 9
that inaccurately classified cannabis as a narcotic. 10 The 1971 law
may have had its origin in DuPage County where an unrelenting
prosecutor refused to reduce marijuana sale charges to possession,
but rather obtained the mandatory minimum penitentiary penalty
of ten years, even for small sales of marijuana to classmates by
white, upper middle-class, relatively harmless college students."
Ironically, the 1971 movement toward fair drug legislation was led
by counsel for the Illinois Crime Commission, whose director for
many years was Charles Siragusa, a law-and-order exponent if
there ever was one."2 Also in the name of fairness, though the new
law did not apply to previously convicted felons, the Illinois Parole
and Pardon Board individually reviewed the case of every one of
hundreds of incarcerated drug offenders, who were aided by advocates from the student bodies of several Illinois law schools. Governor Ogilvie granted partial commutations to a majority of those
convicts to make their sentences more nearly approximate what
would have been appropriate if the new law had been applied to
experts believe that, decades from now, the governor will play'a sentencing role
by granting commutations.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, § 701-719, §§ 1100-1603 (1971).
8. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§ 704, 705, 1402-1404 (1971).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 22-1 to 22-49.1 (1969).
10. See People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).

11. McCabe did not present these facts, but, at one time, the DuPage County

State's Attorney's office appeared to apply a firm policy of not reducing sale cases
to possession. In many other counties, especially Cook, the mandatory minimum
of ten years for a sale (or gratuitous transfer) of any quantity of marijuana, under

ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 22-40 (1969), provided an excellent lesson in how legisla-

tion restricting judicial discretion broadens the sentencing discretion of the prosecutor, who has the power to determine what charges to file and what reductions of
charges to permit. See note 34 and text accompanying note 36 infra.
12. Mr. Siragusa's term as executive director of the Commission was interrupted by a brief retirement, but his service included a part of the time when the
Commission's counsel, Roger Nauert, was working for revisions of the drug, marijuana and narcotic law. Even more ironically, Mr. Siragusa is the only person I
ever heard speak fondly of Federal Bureau of Narcotics Commissioner Harry Anslinger, his one-time associate. Popular consensus accuses Mr. Anslinger of almost
single-handedly bringing unreasonable marijuana penalties into American law.
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their old cases."3

Let me now trace some of the earlier developments in the Illinois law of sentencing.
1819. The state's first sentencing statute reserves sentencing
power for the legislature by mandating death for treason, murder,
arson and rape." For lesser offenses, the judge is given discretion
to fix a determinate sentence within a specified range-so many
lashes, so many stripes or, for some offenses, so many months or
because
years of incarceration, 8 short periods by today's standards
16
wilderness.
the
in
centers
detention
of
of the paucity
1833. The jury shares the sentencing power in rape and arson
cases, with death no longer mandated upon conviction. 17 The jury
fixes the term of years, while the judge dictates whether confinement shall be solitary or at hard labor."8
1867. The death penalty is no longer mandated for any offense. For the most serious offenses, the jury retains the life-death
choice and control over the length of imprisonment.1'
1872. The legislature reasserts its authority by enacting a
schedule of good-time credits, which reduce the'period of incarceration imposed by judge or jury.2 0
1895. Illinois switches to an extreme version of indeterminate
sentencing. No matter what period of incarceration has been imposed by judge or jury, administrative officials can release a prisoner at any time, upon the condition that the warden keep in
touch with the prisoner for at least six months.2 1
1911. Probation is provided as an alternative to imprisonment.
13. These figures are based upon my own memory and those of other attor-

neys who also assisted in the commutation proceedings. It was a remarkable pro-

gram, for which then Parole and Pardon Chairman Lawrence X. Pusateri deserves
much credit.
14. An Act Respecting Crimes and Punishment, §§ 1, 2, 12, 18, ILL. PUB.

(1819).
15. See, e.g., punishments described in An Act Respecting Crimes and Punishment, §§ 3, 5, 20, ILL. PUB. LAWS (1819).
LAWS

16. See A.

BRUCE,

J.

HARNO &

E.

BURGESS, PAROLE AND THE INDETERMINATE

20-21 (1928) [hereinafter referred to as the Clabaugh Report].
17. An Act Relative to Criminal Jurisprudence, §§ 48, 58, ILL. REV. STAT.
(1833).
18. Id. at § 158.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, Div. XV, § 9 (Gross 3d ed. 1871).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108, §§ 45-48 (1874).
21. An Act Relative to the System of Persons Convicted of Crime and Providing for a System of Parole, ILL. PUB. LAWS (1895). See Clabaugh Report, supra
note 16, at 37-39.
SENTENCE
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Discretion is vested in the judge to exercise the "in-out" power.2
Between then and now, there have been at least a dozen modifications of that power, with the legislature defining what offenses and
what past criminal records will render a defendant ineligible for
probation.18
1917. The legislature limits the administrators' authority by
establishing minimum periods which must be served before parole
eligibility.2 4
1928. Despite the 1917 changes, indeterminate sentencing and
the parole authority are under heavy attack. Board ChairmanClabaugh commissions a study by law and sociology professors
from Illinois, Northwestern and Chicago.2 Professor Bruce and his
colleagues defend indeterminate sentencing, employing law-and-order rhetoric. Prisoners, the professors say, serve more time under
an indeterminate sentence scheme than under determinate
sentences.26 This claim was identical to the assertion of some liberal reformers who, half a century later, and mistakenly if Professor Zimring is correct, asserted that determinate sentences would
be shorter sentences.
1941. The jury's power to sentence for serious felonies is retained. For lesser felonies, the judge loses all discretion except as
to the "in-out" decision. Every burglar who is not given probation
receives one year to life.27 The parole authorities have enormous
power.
1943. For the less serious felonies, the judge is allowed to impose a minimum penalty at or in excess of the statutory minimum,
and a maximum at or less than the statutory maximum.
Sentences such as not less than five years nor more than ten years
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 509(b) (1913).
23. For current limitations on the use of probation, see ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-5-3(c)(2) (1979). See also People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537,

416 N.E.2d 259 (1981), which upheld legislative restrictions upon the sentencing
judge's power to use the probation alternative.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 498 (1919).
25. The result was the Clabaugh Report, supra note 16.
26. Clabaugh Report, supra note 16, at 51-52.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84, 802 (1941). The statute permitted the judge,
at the time of sentencing, to make an "advisory" recommendation as to when the
convict should be paroled. The parole authorities were bound by this recommendation unless at least four of the five Board members rejected it. The Illinois
Supreme Court invalidated this judicial role in parole. See People v. Montana,
380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d 569 (1942).28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84, 802 (1943).
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reduce the parole authorities' discretion.
1961 and 1963. The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure take from the jury formal sentencing power, except in
capital cases, and place it with the judge.2 All felony sentences are
indeterminate, at least in form, so the parole authorities share in
the power. 80 Except where consecutive sentences are imposed, however, all offenders are eligible for a parole hearing in eleven years
and three months,8 1 a drastic change from pre-1961 law. For example, under earlier law, when a jury imposed a sentence of 199 years
for murder, parole eligibility came only after sixty-seven years had
been served.82
1967. The work release alternative was created." Then came
the changes of 1971, 1973 and 1978 described in Professor Zimring's remarks and in this commentary.
DISPARITY AND THE ZONE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Professor Zimring spoke of a particular concern in the 1970's
among correction officials, judges and academicians over sentence
disparity. Disparity results from a zone of discretion. In a pure determinate sentencing system, the legislature would delegate sentencing discretion to no one. Rather, it would provide a fixed
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(b), (c) (1961).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(e) (1961).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 123-2 (1963) combined with administrative goodtime regulations to yield this result.
32. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 801.1 (1961) (repealed 1963), and People ex
rel. Kubala v. Kinney, 25 Ill. 2d 491, 185 N.E.2d 337 (1962). Before January 1,
1964, a defendant who had received a life sentence (as distinguished from a sentence of 99, 199, or 299 years), was eligible for parole after twenty years. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 801.1 (1963). Thus, before January 1, 1964, a prisoner with a life
sentence was far better off than one with a sentence of 199 years. Although before
January 1, 1962, the jury decided between life and a term of years for the most
serious offenses, jurors were kept ignorant of the parole eligibility consequences of
their actions, at least according to one Cook County lawyer who practiced in that
era. See W. LASSERS, SCAPEGOAT JUSTICE 92-93 (1973).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 123-7 (1967). The statutory reference is to an
alternative available, within the administrator's discretion, to defendants who
have received and served part of a penitentiary sentence. Its counterpart is now
found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-13-1 (1979). The sentencing alternative of
judicially imposed work release probably began under the judiciary's power to impose probationary conditions not specifically enumerated in the statute. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 117-2(5) (1967). Today the Code recognizes periodic imprisonment as a distinct sentencing alternative. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-7-1
(1979).
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schedule of tolls which the convict must pay, based upon precise
objective factors, including the specifics of his act and his prior
criminal history. The first lesson from the Illinois experience is
that not since 1867 have we had such a system of mandatory determinate penalties.3 4 Regardless how sentencing power has been allocated, three and one-half generations of reformers, including those
of 1978, have refused to eliminate a zone of judicial discretion.
Why is this so, considering that discretion breeds disparity?
First, as Professor Zimring has suggested, no statutory scheme
can eliminate discretion. The received wisdom is that in the days
of the mandatory death penalties, juries in Illinois and elsewhere
evaded the law, where they perceived the penalty as too harsh, by
acquitting guilty defendants."' Moreover, as Professor Zimring and
others have demonstrated, as long as there is prosecutorial discretion (the ultimate sacred cow in the criminal justice system) to
34. Although Illinois has not had any system of fixed mandatory penalties in
the last century, Illinois statutes, from time to time, have called for mandatory
life sentences in a few situations, typically under repeat offender statutes. "Second sale" of narcotics called for a mandatory penalty of life until the reform of
1971. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 22-40 (1969) (repealed 1973). The present Illinois statute mandates natural life for certain repeat offenders. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 33-B (Supp. 1979 & 1980). However, discretion under both provisions remained with the prosecutor to determine whether, after conviction, to file the certified copies of prior convictions necessary to mandate judicial imposition of the
life sentence. There has yet to be any significant experience under the present
habitual offender law. Under the old "second sale" law, prosecutors sometimes
did not file proof of the prior conviction, even after a contested trial, at least in
Cook County. I recall one case where only the vigor with which counsel defended
his client persuaded the prosecutor to exercise his "discretion" in favor of
"mandatory life." In another case in 1967, or thereabouts, a trial judge
sentenced
a defendant to ten years to ten years and a day for a small sale of marijuana, even
though the yung Cook County prosecutor filed proof of the prior sale conviction.
The prosecutor went to his superior, enraged over the "unlawful" sentence, and
asked whether mandamus would lie. The superior, as the story is told, said "Are
you nutty? Ten years is plenty." Cf. People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d
537, 416 N.E.2d 259 (1981), which reiterated the principle that mandamus will lie
to correct an illegally lenient sentence, even if the prosecutor seems "nutty" in
refusing to exercise discretion to avoid a legislatively imposed "mandatory"
sentence.
35. Supposedly this phenomenon accounted in capital cases for the recognition of the challenge for cause of prospective jurors who had religious or conscientious scruples against the death penalty, a procedure used in every death penalty
jurisdiction before it was invalidated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968). It also supposedly gave rise to the use of a discretionary death penalty.
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-96 (1976) and the authorities
cited therein.
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charge an offense of a grade less serious than the facts can support,
or to reduce a charge to a lesser offense or to withhold the filing of
papers necessary to trigger a habitual offender mandatory penalty,3" similarly situated defendants may receive disparate
sentences. A rigid determinate sentence scheme which narrows or
eliminates judicial discretion increases, pro tanto, the prosecutor's
discretionary power in sentencing. Reformers of sentencing laws
who forget this-and there have been many-are in danger of doing more harm than good.
Second, just as sentencing considerations cannot be separated
from their substantive law context, as Professor Zimring's perceptive reference to the burglary statute demonstrates, so also rational
sentencing policies cannot be developed without reference to the
prevailing procedural context. The administration of American
criminal cases ordinarily provides concessions to defendants who
plead guilty. 7 For such concessions to be possible, either the prosecutor or the judge must have a zone of discretion, 8 which also
makes for possible disparate sentences.
Third, we have avoided pure determinate sentencing because
human language 'does not suffice to detail all the circumstances
which bear upon an appropriate sentence. Even an "elegantly
graded series of crimes and offenders" will mandate identical punishment for offenders who are not similarly situated-an injustice
which, as Professor Morris and others have suggested, is as grave
as unequal sentences for identical offenders.39
Fourth, in quest of the rehabilitative ideal, we are constantly
seeking alternatives to penitentiary incarceration: probation and
conditional discharge, 0 supervision,"' work release and periodic
36. See notes 11 & 34 supra.
37. This is true when the concessions are part of a negotiated plea. It is also
true when a defendant enters a "blind" guilty plea in reliance upon the sentencing court's past practice of treating defendants who plead guilty more leniently
than those who are convicted after a contested trial.
38. In theory the prosecutor has discretion as to the charge, while the judge
has discretion only as to the sentence within the zone defined by the statute
under which the prosecutor has brought the charge. In practice, depending upon
judicial philosophy and individual temperament, some judges exert pressure upon
prosecutors to reduce charges as part of plea negotiation.
39. Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REv. 267, 280-81
(1977).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (1979).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1 (Supp. 1979 & 1980). See note 44
infra.
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imprisonment,42 drug treatment, 3 and a variety of Cook County,
Illinois alternatives which were never sanctioned by statute, such
as the dispositions called "sitting out periods""14 and "good behavior" 5 which were used at least as late as 1968. As long as the judge
retains the authority to choose an alternative to incarceration (the
"in-out" power), the zone which breeds disparity will exist. As Professor Zimring points out, when the alternative is between probation and, for example, a four-year determinate sentence, the possibility of disparity is greatly increased.
Parenthetically, I once asked Professor David Fogel how he
could defend such a potential source of disparity.' 6 He responded
that disparity was wrong because of its effect on penitentiary in42. See note 33 supra.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 120 (Supp. 1979 & 1980).
44. A sitting out period was a term (perhaps sixty days) in the House of Corrections, following an admission or a determination of guilt. The judge imposed
the term without entering judgment. The theory was that, in order to prevent
entry of a judgment of conviction, the defendant agreed to a high bond or to no
bond while his case was continued. None of this was explained to the defendant.
One thoroughly decent judge with whom I served as a prosecutor told defendants
that "60 days' S.O.P. is the break of a lifetime." At the completion of the period,
the defendant was released without conviction, perhaps on supervision. In those
days supervision also lacked authority in law, although in theory it was a long
continuance. See People v. Breen, 62 II. 2d 323, 342 N.E.2d 31 (1976), and note
41 supra. Sitting out periods, a totally unauthorized form of post-trial incarceration, left the scene at about the time that the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board made
its appearance.
45. "Good behavior" was another disposition which terminated a young offender's prosecution without conviction. It was noted on his criminal arrest information sheet, but it did not involve any penalty or supervisory conditions. It was
used for minor matters, such as curfew violations. Occasionally it was used in
more serious misdemeanor cases, when the prosecutor knew he could not prove
his case but bargained for some disposition other than a dismissal. The disposition actually entered was a dismissal, as was true in the 1960's in "peace bond"
cases in Cook County. In the latter cases, the defendant would be required to sign
the "bond," a folded-over piece of paper with the writing obscured. The clerk
would deposit the paper in the wastebasket after the defendant left the courtroom. The procedure did not resemble the use of peace bonds which was then
(and is now) provided by law. See ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, § 200-6 (1969).
46. Professor Fogel, who was then Executive Director of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, provided the basic concepts for the first draft of the determinate sentencing proposal for Illinois. See generally D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE
LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1st ed. 1975). Commission
counsel, Robert Schuwerk, was the first draftsman, although the project was undertaken for Governor Walker without involvement of I.L.E.C. Commissioners.
Many other persons played a draftsman's role before the law was enacted.
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mates, when the fellow with, for example, a sentence of seven years
compares notes with a cellmate of equivalent culpability who received three years. No such problem would exist under his system
Dr. Fogel explained, because the fellow on probation would not be
present at the penitentiary as a reminder to the inmates of the
system's disparity. He offered this explanation, not in jest, but as
the best defense he had for a scheme which provided a graded determinate sentence structure even for probationable offenses.
I do not defend sentencing disparity for its own sake. Yet I
feel that academicians and some judges engage in unwarranted
breast-beating over disparate sentences of similarly situated offenders. They say there is no just sentence if sentences are disparate. All sentences are relative, they assert. They claim that there
is no objectively just term, without reference to sentences imposed
upon other offenders. Apparently, in their view, if two persons
commit particularly heinous murders, and one gets one year while
the other gets three years, the second has been denied justice because of the disparity.
I disagree. Certainly in its treatment of citizens, government
cannot arbitrarily be "generous" to some and "fair" to others. It
does not have the power of the deity or of St. Matthew's Lord of
the Vineyard, who paid the just and agreed-upon wage to the
workers who labored all day, and the same to those who toiled but
an hour."' Yet disparity does not spring from arbitrariness; it flows
from the necessity and the inevitability of discretion. In a system
which places discretion where it belongs, in the judiciary, most disparity results from (1) the existence of a necessary zone of discretion, and (2) the exercise of discretion by judges with different philosophies, different values, and different views of a particular case
of criminal conduct.
The student who leaves law school and begins practice, civil or
criminal, soon learns a lesson rarely taught and never fully comprehended in academic halls: even in a corruption-free system, often
the most significant factor in determining the outcome of a case is
the assignment of the matter to one particular judge rather than to
*another. It cannot be otherwise. Our system is not viewed as unjust
because some judges or juries convict defendants whom others
would acquit. On the contrary, we praise the jury system, which is
capable of tremendously disparate results, and, within broad limits, we pay great deference to the discretionary decisions of the
47. Matthew 20:1-16.
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trier of fact. We believe that rigid formulae-for example, the Talmudic requirement of two witnesses-which are partly designed to
prevent disparate results upon similar facts, would do more to
frustrate justice than would a system that permits one jury to convict and another to acquit on the basis of the same evidence.48
Moreover, in our criminal justice system, many offenders are never
tried, much less sentenced. Many fall by the wayside before trial.
Why do today's reformers focus almost exclusively upon disparate
treatment of similar offenders among only the few who are
convicted?
THE RHETORIC OF REFORM

Finally, let me say a word about the law-and-order packaging
of Illinois Public Act 80-1099. It did not begin with the governor
who lent his name to this lecture series and who placed the "mark
of X" upon House Bill 1500.11 It commenced one morning in 1975
when, on national television, Governor Thompson's predecessor,
Governor Dan Walker, announced that he would abolish parole, a
law-and-order stance if there ever was one. When Dr. Fogel and his
staff drafted the specifics for Governor Walker, however, they provided that a ten-year sentence would be completed in five years
and then the inmate would be unconditionally discharged.1 Ultimately, like most states which abolished parole discretion, Illinois
48. The trend is away from rigid rules, such as those which prohibit a conviction based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an alleged accomplice or
upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an alleged victim of rape or other forms of sexual
assault.

49. See generally J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZA(1977).
50. P.A. 80-1099 is commonly known as "Class X" because of the Class X
category added to the Code of Corrections. The mandatory minimum penalties
for Class X offenses such as rape and armed robbery, which previously were Class
1 offenses, are only slightly more onerous than before, taking into account the
more liberal good-time credit system. See ILL. 'REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 11-1,
1005-8-1 (1977); ILL. DEPT. CORR. ADM. REG. 813, 843, 866. The maximum terms
can be more severe in that a judge can prevent release for fifteen years by imposing a thirty-year maximum, or for thirty years by imposing a sixty-year extended
TION STUDY OF CRIMINAL COURTS

term. See

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 38, §§ 1005-8-1, 1005-8-2 (1979).

51. This proposal of H.B. 1500 passed the Illinois House of Representatives
in June, 1977. See 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, House J., Vol. II, 2186-2214 (1977) for
its text. The House version spoke of a "parole term", but it provided nobody with
the power to revoke parole and no consequences for the violation of parole
conditions.
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retained post-release supervision by providing, through good-time
credits, for early release, conditioned upon parole-like restrictions.6 2 The liberal-conservative wedding occurred before a single
word was written in the earliest draft of the bill which eventually
became the new Illinois determinate sentence law.
Neither Governor Walker nor Governor Thompson can be
faulted for using law-and-order rhetoric-any more than can the
authors of the 1928 Clabaugh Report-if each sincerely believed
that this was the best way to achieve fairness.
The new Illinois law abolishes parole discretion, which is fair.
It provides inmate certainty and rejects the notion that penitentiary punishment serves primarily a rehabilitative function. The
new law retains discretion, as it must, placing much of that discretion with the judiciary. These elements are fair. The law continues
appellate review of sentences, not to eliminate disparity by equalizing sentences, but to safeguard against unfairly harsh sentences."
It increases sentences for serious crimes against persons, slightly
lessening them for less serious offenses.54 This also is fair. It allows
room for the informal use of sentence guidelines, such as those now
employed in Cook County, so that the exercise of discretion will be
an informed one.5 5
52. ILL. REV. STAi. ch. 38, §§ 1003-3-7 to 1003-3-10 (1979). See also note 2
supra.
53. "Sentence equalization" was left to the Supreme Court of Illinois under
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-4.2 (1978). The court has not promulgated any
rules pursuant to this purported grant of authority. The statute created a "rebuttable presumption" standard for review of sentences. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1005-5-4.1 (1978). The state's high court invalidated P.A. 80-1099's provisions for
appellate review, holding that the court is to determine the availability and scope
of appellate review, according to the state constitution. People v. Cox, 82 Inl. 2d
268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980). Thus the standard of review remains "abuse of discretion." Id.
54. See notes 5 & 50 supra. The "ordinary range" for Class 2 felonies is three
to seven years rather than one to twenty; for Class 3 felonies it is two to five
years, rather than one to ten years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1979);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (1977). Perhaps the data will prove that even for
less serious felonies, time actually served under determinate sentences will be
longer (in Illinois and elsewhere) than under indeterminate sentences. Among
many commentators whom I have heard characterize the Illinois system, Professor Zimring is the first to suggest that determinate terms will be longer for less
serious offenses. On the surface, there is tension between this assertion and Professor Zimring's observations that increased prison populations are due to convictions of more felons rather than to increased terms of imprisonment.
55. If disparity is the major problem, the use in future sentencing of "mean"
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In short, the legislators, academicians and the staffs of two
governors-liberals and conservatives-forged a compromise that
suggests that they learned many lessons from the history of sentencing in Illinois.

and "average" terms of past dispositions, received for similar crimes by similar
offenders, does not deserve the ridicule which Professor Zimring accords it. Even
if the goal is the elusive true and just sentence, we would be better off guided by
the collective judgment of a large number of experienced jurists than by the intuition of a draftsman as to what is just. Although the Cook County guideline system
is not highly sophisticated, it conveys enough information to allow a judge a sense
of how the "average" judge would sentence in the case at hand. Sentencing councils, as used in some United States District Courts, serve a similar function.

